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FROM

time immemorial, philosophy has bceii a compound of
which metaphysics, psycholog^y. logic, ethics a'l theology formed
Professor John
the ingredients, though in varying proportions.
branch
of ethics,
philosophy
:is
a
Dewey, as we have seen, regards
i

and as a body of propositions and principles peculiarly
plav the role of reconciler, interpreter, guide and purifier

in a sense,
fitted to

Philosophv

of values.

is

not. in

Professor Dewey's opinion, a rival

must, indeed, follow science, and take care to assimilate
established scientific truths, in order to fulfill its own more general
and more synthetic function. Yet, surprisingly enough. Professor

of science

:

it

Dewev's svstem of philosophy essays

to correct

and even revolution-

accepted propositions in more than one special science.
This shows perhaps that no school of philosophy can escape the
necessity of developing its own metaphysics, its own psychology and
ize certain

its

own

logic.

Be

on questions not

this as

it

may. however. Professor Dewev's views
by his own definitions and

strictlv philosophical

delimitations are both arresting and important: they have influenced
and continue to influence students of philosophy and metaphysics,
and they are vital to the body of doctrines known as Pragmatism.

Let us begin with the so-called fundamental question as
stuff of the universe."

to "the

Is this ultimate stuff material or psychical

?

which attempts have
Libraries have been filled up with volumes
been made to answer this question. Professor Dewey and his school
in

start

by analyzing the question
and in human

facts in nature

To
ter,

quote Professor

Dewey

itself.

How

does

it

occur at all?

What

activity give rise to it?
:

"The vague and mysterious properties assigned to mind and matthe very conceptions of mind and matter in traditional thought.
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are ghosts walking underground.

.

.

The matter

.

of science

character of natural events, and changes as they change.

events are so complex and varied that there

is

a

Natural

nothing surprising

is

in their possession of dififerent characterizations, characters so dif-

Nothing but un-

ferent that they can easily be treated as opposites.
familiarity stands in the

way

of thinking of both

mind and matter

as

which matter expresses
their sequential order and mind the order of their meanings in their
logical connections and dependencies.
different characters of natural events, in

.

.

.

"That to which both mind and matter belong

the complex of

is

events that constitute nature."

Of course, there is a process which we call thinking and operawe call mental. But "thinking is no different in kind from the

tions

use of natural materials and energies, say

and

tools, to refine,

reorder and shape other natural materials, say ore."

At no point or

place

is

there any

relations.
sist

jump

fire

outside empirical, natural objects and their

"Thought and reason are not

specific

powers.

They

con-

of the procedures intentionally employed in the application to

each other of the unsatisfactorily confused and indeterminate, on
the one hand, and the regular and stable on the other.

..."

"The idea that matter, life and mind represent separate kinds of
Being springs from a substantiation of eventual functions. The
fallacy converts consequences of interaction of events into causes

of the occurrence of these consequences.

..."

mind and matter are not static structures, but functional
characters, and the distinctions between physical, psycho-physical
and mental is one of levels of increasing complexity and intimacy
In short,

of interaction
It is

among

natural events."

hardly necessary to point out that modern science fully sup-

ports Professor Dewey's characterization of matter and of mind.

And, as he observes, and as Spencer observed long ago, the quarrel
between materialists and spiritualists has absolutely no meaning. We
are getting rid of unreal problems, of problems created by arbitrary
distinctions and misleading terms of our own invention, and the
sooner philosophy and theology follow the example of science in
dropping empty dialectics and attacking real problems, the better for
their influence and for human progress.
In

dealmg with

another

ancient

and troublesome question,

namely, the "paralellism" of external and internal events, the relation of the brain to thinking, the

mystery of what we

call

conscious-
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equally felicitous and

convincing.

Not

that he denies the existence of "mystery," or that he claims

He

that science has explained or can explain everything in nature.

"The wonder and mystery do not seem
wonder and mvstery that there should be such
says:

existential events, at

and that

all,

a thing as nature, as

being they should be what they

in

transferred to the whole course of

The wonder should be

are.

be other than the

to

Since mind cannot evolve except where there

is an
which the fulfillments of the past are conserved
and employed, it is not surprising that mind, when it evolves, should
be mindful of the past and future, and that it should use the structures which are biological adaptations of organism and environment
as its own and only organs. In ultimate analysis, the mystery that
mind should use a body, or that a body should have a mind, is like

things.

.

.

.

organized process

in

the mystery that a
the

man

cultivating plants should use a

grows plants

soil that

at all

soil,

should grow those adapted to

or that
its

own

physico-chemical properties and lelations."

The world
has developed

is

in

what

mind from organic

it

life,

Mind has developed

is.

Tt is

it.

in

it,

arbitrary to separate life

and then marvel

just as lite

from nature,

at the mysteries of their

Rational advance, says Professor Dewey, or recovery from

union.

present confusion and madness, "depends upon seeing and using
these specifiable things as links functionally significant in a process.

To

see the organism in nature, the nervous system in the organism,

the brain in the nervous system, the cortex in the brain
to the

is

the answer

problems which haunt philosophy."

We may

observe here that Professor

Dewey would

not object to

what change,
addition or readjustment and recombination convert what we call

purely

scientific,

experimental

dead matter into living

tissue,

efiforts to

ascertain just

for example, or to ascertain

the

all

conditions under which the mystery called "thinking" takes place,

and exactly where
as such,

is

it

takes place.

His position

is

not concerned with such problems, any

that philosophy,

more than

it

is

concerned with the question of diminishing returns in agriculture
or with the soundness of the quantitative theory of money.

The

question of the reality or function of "consciousness"

is

naturally discussed in connection with the bodv-mind organism which

nature has evolved in

man and which

in turn observes nature, accomenvironment and, when possible, modifies environmental factors to suit its realized needs and interests.

modates

itself to the

—

:
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Dewey doe

Professor

not waste time, space or ingenuity in deal-

ing with verbal objections or prejudices against old terms charged

with theological or unscientific connotations.

Thus he

finds use

even for the term "soul," and his definition of that word should be
quite acceptable to irreconcilable Agnostics.

ness has wrought

much

The term

conscious-

mischief in psychology, but Professor

Dewey

on that account. He insists, however, on a very
careful definition of it. His own definition is as lucid as it is adequate. "Consciousness in a being with language," he says, "denotes

would not outlaw

it

awareness or perception of meanings

;

it

is

the perception of actual

events, whether past, contemporary or future, in their

of course, than that
tural,

substantial, a

The

meanings

mind is enormously wider,
of consciousness "mind is, so to speak, strucconstant background and foreground percep-

the having of actual ideas."

field of
;

;

process, a series of heres and nows.

Con-

tive consciousness

is

sciousness

were, the occasional interception of messages con-

as

is,

it

.

.

.

few
and renders them aud"Consciousness, an idea, is that phase of a system of meanible."
ings which at a given time is undergoing redirection, transitive transformation.
Consciousness is the meaning of events in course
of remaking its 'cause' is only the fact that this is one of the ways
in which nature goes on."
The attempt to separate consciousness into two phases. Professor Dewey regards as futile.
"Immediate consciousness, he says,
cannot be described, not because of any mystery behind it, but because "it is something bad, not communicated and known." We
cannot tell what consciousness is. but thanks to speech, a thing had
may be had in a particularly illuminating way. Because of words,
consciousness is focalization of meanings.
We become aware of
Conrelations of the thing had to other things and other events.
sciousness is not an entity which makes differences it is the difference that is in the process of making, and that process is due to
awareness of new meanings, imperceived connections, mental discoveries, the warnings and criticisms of others, self-criticism.
And what is it we are aware of when conscious? The distinction made between objects and events is valid enough, if not
stretched. Says Professor Dewey
"Objects are precisely what we are aware of. For objects are
events with meanings; tables, chairs, stars, the milky way, electrons,
ghosts, centaurs, historic epochs, and all the infinitely multifarious

tinually transmitted, as a mechanical receiving device selects a

of the vibrations with which the air

.

.

is filled

.

;

;
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nouns, verbs and

.

"Events are present and operative any^i'oy : what concerns us is
meanmgs expressed in expectations, beliefs, inferences regardEvents have effects or consequences,
ing their potentialities.
and since meaning is awareness of these consequences before they
actually occur, reflective inquiry, which converts an event into an
their

.

object,

same thing

the

is

.

.

as finding out a

meaning which the event

already possesses by imputation."

A

mere shock

We

sor Dewey.
it,

to connect

it

is an event, but not an object, illustrates Profeshave to interpret the shock, to assign a meaning to
with other events, and in doing all this we convert

the event into an object, a significant thing.

Why
mind"?
its

Dewey

prefer the

compound term "body-

Because, he answers, this term designates "an affair with

own

properties," and describes

body

a living
tion

does Professor

and

is

"what actually takes place when

implicated in situations of discourse, communica-

participation.

In the hyphenated phrase 'body-mind,' body

designates the continued and conserved, the registered and cumulative operation of factors

continuous with the rest of nature

;

while

'mind' designates the characters and consequences which are dif-

which emerge when 'body'
more complex and interdependent situation."

ferential, indicative of features
in a wider,

The

is

engaged

old notions of the independence of the mind, the seat of

must be abandoned. The body has much to do
of what has been accepted concerning alleged
"pure sensations," differences between peripheral and central origins
of perceptions, etc., is obsolete, and the trouble with psychology,
physiology and philosophy is that they continue to use a vocabulary
which is appropriate to intellectual hold-overs or survivals, but which
ideas,

and the

like,

with perception.

fails to

Much

express the conclusions of modern science.

It may be asked at this point what the foregoing observations
have to do with the essential business of philosophy. We have
already pointed out that we may accept all of Professor Dewey's
theories in psychology, logic and metaphysics without indorsing his
conception of philosophy. But it is only fair to recognize that Professor Dewey himself asserts and repeatedly effects a connection
between his theories and propositions in other branches of knowledge and his deliberate definition of philosophy. We may fitly conclude our elaborate
and yet far from adequate review of a re-

—

—

:

:
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markable and significant work with a few quotations
connection

Thus

is

tacitly

made

in

which

this

or implied.

after giving reasons for rejecting the doctrine of parallelism

and the separation of body from mind, Professor Dewey says:
"If the problem is put as one of a more adequate control of behavior through knowledge of its mechanism, the situation becomes
very dififerent. How should we treat a particular meaning as sound
datum for inference, as an effect of habit irrespective of present
condition, as an instance of desire, or a consequence of hope or fear,
a token of some past psycho-physical maladjustment, or how? Such

—

life.
They are typical
way of answering if we are to
mastering our own behavior similar to that

questions as these are urgent in the conduct of

of questions which

we must

achieve any method of

which we have achieved

find a

and

in respect to heat

electricity, coal

and

iron."

In discussing the distinction between events and objects, as de-

by him. Professor Dewey says
"Philosophy must explicitly note that the business of reflection is
to take events which brutally occur and brutally affect us
to con-

fined

—

by means of inference as to their probable
consequences. These are the meanings imputed to the events under
consideration.
Otherwise philosophy finds itself in a hopeless imPhilosophy has only to state, to make explicit, the difpasse.
ference between events which are challenges to thought and events
which have met the challenge and hence possess meaning. It has

vert

them

.

.

into objects

.

only to note that bare occurrenfe

in the

way

of having, being or

—

seeking
undergoing is the provocation and
and finding unapparent connections, so that thinking terminates
when an object is present: namely, when a challenging event is endowed with stable meanings through relationship to something exinvitation to thought

trinsic but connected."

Finally, in dealing with consciousness

lack of appropriate, beneficial action
follow. Professor

"We have

Dewey

and resultant action, or the
it might be expected to

when

writes

at present little or

next to no controlled art of secur-

ing that redirection of behavior which constitutes adequate perception or consciousness.
in

fundamentals

That

—namely,

is,

we have

in the

little

or no art of education

management of

the organic atti-

tudes which color the qualities of our conscious objects and acts."

"The world seems made

in

preoccupation with what

is

specific,

particular, disconnected in medicine, politics, science, industry, edu-
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In terms of a conscious control of inclusive wholes search

cation.

for those links which occupy key positions and

nections

is

mdispensable."

"Clearly,

we have

.

.

efifect critical

con-

.

not carried the plane of conscious control, tht

direction of action by perception of connections, far enough.

Wt

and mind from physical nature without
also separating nature from life and mind.
The separation has
reached a point where intelligent persons are asking whether the end
is to be catastrophe, the subjection of man to the industrial and
military machines he has created."
cannot separate organic

life

The foregoing paragraphs make

the claim that a true conception

of philosophy and a correct understanding of the operations of the

"body-mind" constitute not merely the beginning of wisdom, but
toward a rational and harmonious human
society. Obviously, this claim grows out of a certain estimate of the
role of intelligence and reason. Professor Dewey, as we have seen,
promises no Golden Age, and does not overlook the influence of passion, of envy, of greed, of ambition, of fear and of antipathy in
also the first long step

human

afifairs

;

but he does believe that

derstood the body-mind,

if

made allowances

we knew

ourselves, un-

for habits and bias, and

honestly endeavored to measure consequences and

efifects

or impulsive acts, whether individual, group or national,

of hasty

many

of

our grave problems, so fraught with mischief and woe, would yield
more readily to solutions in conformity with what we rightly call
our better nature.

